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Abstract
Safety is critical to the success of the aviation industry, and as it continues to develop worldwide and link more people and places, how
aviation safety is standardized has been and will continue to be a global concern. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
has developed a comprehensive framework for safety management at airlines and airports, known as Doc. 9859 Safety Management
Manual (SMM). Safety Management Systems (SMS) have since been required to be implemented by all ICAO member states beginning
January 2010. Taiwan, administered by the Republic of China (ROC), is in a unique position as a non-member state of ICAO that is
strongly connected to the world’s aviation system. Using the Delphi Technique and convenient sampling, this research is a case study of
how aviation safety is managed at a major international airport in Taiwan with respect to ICAO’s SMS standards. Interviews and focus
groups were conducted with participants from three major organizations operating at the surveyed airport: air traffic controllers, the airport
management company, and a ground services provider. Results found that despite Taiwan’s non-member status with ICAO, safety
management was very consistent with ICAO SMS standards, especially in the areas this study focused on: safety policy and objectives,
safety risk management, safety assurance, and safety promotion.
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Introduction
In July 2011, a woman slipped under a barbed wired fence in the middle of the night, drove a truck in which staff had
apparently left keys, and entered an airplane cockpit. Early in 2010, a terminal jet bridge collapsed and, in early 2011, a
luggage truck driven by ground crews struck the engine cowling of an airline’s cargo plane. As airport operations are
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complex, and high-profile incidents receive intense scrutiny
from the public and media, airport employees indeed play a
critical role in upholding operational safety. To actively
engage every airport worker in managing safety, the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), an
aviation-specialized agency of United Nations (UN), has
started to promote Safety Management Systems (SMS) to
its members by introducing a guidebook in 2006, Doc.
9859: Safety Management Manual (SMM). All ICAO
members are required to implement Doc. 9859 at airlines
and airports after January 2010 and a periodic report is
mandatory and enforced by ICAO. While Taiwan is not a
member of UN, how Taiwan’s airports comply with ICAO
rules is an important issue due to Taiwan’s strong
accommodation of international flights and international
economic ties. This research is a case study of how airport
safety is managed in Taiwan.
The Research Airport
The research airport is a large international airport in
Taiwan. Airline services are provided by more than 30
carriers, and four airlines have significant operations at the
research airport: China Airlines, EVA Airways, Transsia
Airways, and Far Eastern Airlines. The former two airlines
provide long-haul international service to North America,
Europe, and Australia, and all four provide strong regional
service within Southeast Asia. Recently, due to the
improving relationship with mainland China, all air carriers
have increased direct cross-strait flights to more than 15
cities in China. Nearly all flag carriers (airlines representing
the states they serve) within Asia fly directly to this
research airport. In addition, the research airport has seen
an increase of service from low-cost carriers (LCCs),
providing service primarily to Southeast Asia and Japan.
Four United States carriers also provide service to this
airport, as well as several European air carriers (Civil
Aeronautics Administration of Taiwan, n.d.).
The research airport has a variety of other aviationrelated businesses, organizations, and stakeholders. This
airport has two large-scale ground service providers that
provide support service for airlines. These include catering,
aircraft marshalling, and baggage handling. Air traffic
control (ATC) services, administered by Taiwan’s Civil
Aeronautics Administration (CAA), are also a significant
part of this airport’s operation. ATC is comprised of four
services: tower (local) control, approach control, clearance
delivery (providing route clearances to departing aircraft),
and ground control (overseeing aircraft movement on the
ground). Approach control is the only ATC service not
directly connected to the research airport. It is located offsite, and provides control services to airplanes in the
general metropolitan area (including those going to/coming
from another major airport) as well as transiting aircraft that
traverse its airspace.

Other businesses and organizations related to the
research airport include customs and immigration authorities, vendors, ground transportation services providers,
and security staff.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study was to understand safety
management at a major airport in Taiwan. ICAO has
provided clear and specific guidelines for the establishment,
management, and continuous improvement of Safety
Management Systems, and this study aimed to determine
the research airport’s level of compliance with those
standards (despite Taiwan’s non-obligation to follow them).
As this airport is among the busiest commercial airports in
Taiwan, understanding how its safety program is managed
and operated at this airport will provide significant insight as
to Taiwan’s attention and dedication to safety and safety
management, which is critical to the success of a high-risk,
high-consequence industry such as aviation.
Literature Review
In the aviation industry, the ICAO Safety Management
Manual (SMM) is the global guide to designing and
implementing SMS by aviation organizations worldwide.
The ICAO SMM covers a wide variety of topics, including,
but not limited to, basic safety theories, system safety
concepts, and a process for SMS implementation. The
ultimate aims of the ICAO SMM are an integration of
safety management systems and a positive working safety
culture within an organization (ICAO, 2009). More
specifically, the content of the SMM includes the definition
of risk, safety performance, acceptable levels of risk,
individuals’ responsibilities, regulatory compliance requirements, safety education, risk management and hazard
reporting system, audits and monitoring, and risk analysis
and investigation.
The idea behind SMS is to use a transparent system of
policies and procedures to combat threats to safety and
mismanagement of safety-related issues. This is one of the
first attempts at a global aviation safety management
standard. There are two different areas of SMS: a structural
component and an operational component. The structural
component outlines the physical composition of the system,
including policies and guidelines, while the operational
component refers to the day-to-day activities and actual
functions of the SMS (Lowe, 2008). Overall, Safety
Management Systems can be described in four major
areas: Safety policy and objectives, safety risk management, safety assurance, and safety promotion. These
categories are explored further and will be discussed in
the methodology of this study.
A critical factor that ties the entire safety management
system together is how to challenge the current safety
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culture in a way that inspires all members of the
organization to redefine their behaviors reflecting the
importance of safety. This will ultimately put pressure on
employees to constantly improve safety and benefit the
organization as a whole. Along these lines, ICAO (2010)
defines culture as ‘‘collective programming of the mind’’
(p. 2–23). There are three organizational structures:
national, organizational and professional, all of which are
influenced by culture, on the organizational and local
levels. Upper management has the power to develop an
organization’s culture, especially relating to safety, through
its actions and adherence to its own practices and beliefs
(ICAO, 2010).
In 2007, ICAO amended Annex 14 to require airports
with international operations to incorporate safety management systems into their normal practices (Federal Aviation
Administration, 2007). In 2007, the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) published an advisory circular
regarding the introduction of safety management systems
at airports. Although SMS is not currently required by law
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in the United States, the FAA (2007) does believe SMS has
the potential to significantly reduce the likelihood of a
serious accident or incident at airports. In Advisory
Circular AC 150/5200-37, the FAA focuses specifically
on the importance of safety culture. It states, ‘‘The attitudes,
decisions and methods of operation at the policy-making
level, demonstrate the priority given to safety’’ (FAA,
2007, p. 2). It is essential for top-level management to be
heavily invested in safety for both policy and attitude.
Management’s written policies do not influence the culture
of the organization if employees do not believe they are met
with equivalent action. It takes a proactive stance
throughout the entire company to change or create a safety
culture. Safety culture ‘‘concerns the requirement to not
only perceive safety issues but also match them with
appropriate action’’ (FAA, 2007, p. 2).
Advisory Circular (AC) 150/5200-37 also provides a
recommended flow of information pattern, shown below
(See figure 1). This image shows a visual display of the
recommended structure of an SMS for an airport, and

Figure 1. SMS Lifecycle Overview (FAA, 2007).
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exhibits the recursive review of information by combining
a hazard reporting system with safety risk monitoring.
It is important that the SMS addresses hazards as well as
risks, and individuals implementing SMS should work with
those who will be involved with hazard identification and
risk assessment. As the process is developed, it is extremely
important that feedback is received. Continuous monitoring
and improvement are the only ways to ensure the system
develops and resolves issues. An important element that
improves the system is a voluntary hazard reporting
system, which includes several key aspects of employee
participation in a successful safety management system. A
reporting system should be non-punitive in nature because
fear of repercussions from reporting can discourage
employees from utilizing the system. In the advisory
circular, the FAA explains, ‘‘Through regular review and
evaluation, management can pursue continuous improvements in safety management and may revise safety
objectives to ensure that the SMS remains effective and
relevant to the organization’s operation’’ (FAA, 2007, p. 7).
Safety promotion is, as defined by the advisory circular,
‘‘a combination of safety culture, training, and data sharing
activities that supports the implementation and operation of
an SMS in an organization’’ (FAA, 2007, p. 1). For
example, it is fundamentally important to ensure the
training and education of all the employees to the specific
conditions and environment in which they will be working.
Communication must be accomplished from an organizational standpoint as well, through official communication
channels so all employees receive clear and consistent
information. This should be established through the use of
seminars, bulletins, websites and any other means to
constantly convey information (FAA, 2007). As previously
discussed, so much of a successful SMS is grounded in the
fact that people participate actively in it; therefore, effective
communication and the alignment of upper management
and lower level employees on safety values are critical.
Previous studies have looked at how safety is managed
in the airport environment. Some examples of safety
management at airports before the development of Safety
Management Systems even include elements that were later
incorporated in the SMS model. Hale (2001) examined
how Schiphol Airport serving Amsterdam redesigned its
approach to safety management after a fatal accident. The
process included the development of an "Advisory
Committee" which functioned essentially as a predecessor
for the safety committee outlined by the ICAO SMM. It
was ". . . designed to be independent, so as to reassure the
public about the openness and transparency of the airport
regulatory and control system" (Hale, 2001, p. 130). The
committee handled basic safety review and risk assessment
and was a worthy addition to the airport’s safety management program.
Furthermore, the airport incorporated a sophisticated risk
assessment modeling system. Using somewhat of a risk

assessment matrix, it incorporated accident and incident
rates from North America and Europe, which were
controlled for geographical conditions, weather, and airport
layout factors that are inapplicable to Schiphol Airport, to
determine "risk contours" for decision making.
Incorporating these elements of safety management
proved to be a good improvement for Schiphol airport,
and other studies have found safety management principles
later included as part of SMS to be valuable. Remawi,
Bates, and Dix (2011) found that implementing a Safety
Management System in the Sharjah Airport in the United
Arab Emirates was valuable not only for safety management, but the development of a positive safety culture.
They concluded "the introduction of an SMS will influence
the attitude of employees" (p. 632) and that safety culture
improved at the airport.
There are, nonetheless, challenges in the implementation
of SMS in aviation organizations. Leib, Lu, Sun, and
Spence (2012) found challenges to SMS implementation
and development in Mainland China, especially in regards
to safety culture. They concluded, "Chinese aviation
organizations appear to have solid procedures and policies
consistent with international SMS standards as outlined by
ICAO, but may not be fully utilized due to reduced
employee involvement in the SMS" (Leib et al., 2012, p.
36). Given the cultural similarity of Mainland China and
Taiwan, the potential challenges of safety culture development further justify the need to investigate Safety
Management System implementation level at airports and
other aviation organizations in Taiwan.
Research Questions
Clearly SMS is a developed framework for assessing,
mitigating, and review hazards, and despite being a
requirement only for ICAO member states, is a valuable
addition to all aviation safety programs. Therefore, this
study poses the following research questions in relation to
SMS development for the safety program at the research
airport:

N To what extent does the research airport implement
ICAO SMM standards?

N What safety policies does the research airport
management say they have in place?

N How do stakeholders in aviation safety at the research
airport say they participate with safety management?

N How are risks identified and managed at the research
airport?

N How is safety promoted at the research airport?
Because all of ICAO’s members must review Taiwan’s
airport standards in order to sign the treaty of freedoms for
foreign airlines to operate to and from Taiwan, how Taiwan
maintains and meets the international standards is a highly
researchable issue. While human operators are the most
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important variable in an organizational management
equation, how Taiwan’s airport workers adequately perform under an international standard should be revealed. In
particular, after the privatization of the research airport,
strategic plans used by the management group to maintain
the international standard should be discussed.
Methodology and Research Framework
This study was qualitative in nature and utilized
interviews with participants to answer the research
questions. In addition to interviews, researchers conducted
on-site visits and focus group discussions. Interview and
focus group questions were developed to determine how
the airport’s safety program(s) compared to ICAO SMS
and specifically were aiming at the four major areas of
SMS development. These include safety policy and
objectives, safety risk management, safety assurance, and
safety promotion. These questions were based on the ICAO
Gap Analysis Survey, a checklist for determining compliance with ICAO SMS regulations for aviation
service providers.
Sample
The sample for this study was a group of aviation safety
stakeholders (participants) representing three major areas of
direct aviation safety involvement: ground services providers, the airport management company, and air traffic
controllers. Participants have a working knowledge of
safety management at the research airport and have
leadership roles in their safety programs. All participants
were aviation safety managers in various aspects of
operations in and around the research airport. Participants
were identified through contacting major aviation organizations at the research airport and contacting safety managers
who volunteered to participate in the study. Some
participants were interviewed on multiple occasions due
to time constraints, but ultimately followed the same
interview questions and subsequent follow-up questions.
Data Collection
Interview questions were intentionally open and semistructured to provide participants the opportunity to
elaborate on the safety program at the airport without
restricting their responses to detailed specifics of SMS. In
this way, questions assessed their safety program without
the presumption that it was an ICAO SMS. Examples of
questions included:
What kinds of reporting systems are there and how are
they accessed?
Possible follow up questions:

N What information is required for a hazard report?
N What are some statistics on the hazard reports?
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N What is the flow of information?
N Describe anonymity and related issues.
What forms of risk analysis are at the airport/in your
company?
Possible follow up questions:

N How are risks identified?
N Is there a safety committee?
N Please describe its composition and frequency of
meetings.
These semi-structured interviews provided an opportunity for participants to describe the airport safety program
without forcing them to discuss areas that may not be
relevant. The interviews were all conducted face to face,
and were designed to take approximately 30 minutes,
although time was allowed for further discussion if
necessary.
Results and Analysis
Researchers were able to conduct interviews with 12
participants (some individuals were interviewed regarding
different topics on multiple occasions) from three different
aviation organizations at the research airport representing a
total of 20 interview hours. These organizations include air
traffic control, ground services, and airport management.
The interviews and group discussions took place over more
than 10 on-site visits to the research airport. Interviews
were semi-structured to the previously determined list of
questions but allowed for follow up sub-questions.
Responses were coded according to how the answer
addressed various SMS categories based on the research
questions: safety policy and objectives, safety risk management, safety assurance, and safety promotion. The analysis
section looks at each of these areas separately and explains
how the research airport was meeting the demands of those
areas according to the ICAO SMM.
Safety Policy and Objectives
Because the research airport is privately owned, it would
be the airport management company’s responsibility to
administer the Safety Management System. At the research
airport, the management company places the responsibility
of the SMS in its Flight Operations Department. Within this
department, the SMS coordinator is a vice president level
employee whose SMS leadership duties are part time. This
department also maintains the SMS manual, which
provides the goals of the safety program and outlines
the process for safety review, auditing, and the structure of
the SMS. This information is also publicly available on the
website of the airport management company.
Other organizations have their own in-house safety
programs as well. Air traffic controllers maintain a safety
manual that outlines policies and procedures that they
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follow as well as abnormal/emergency procedures. Air
traffic controllers are a small, close-knit group who are
required to make safety decisions quickly, and even the
most junior-level controllers have a high level of authority
and responsibility. Air traffic controllers do not have a
dedicated safety manager, but each air traffic controller is
expected to show safety leadership proactively.
The ground services organization used in this study also
maintains extensive documentation regarding its safety
policy and objectives, including support statements from
upper management describing the importance of safety and
commitment the company has to providing a safe
environment. The safety manager of this organization is a
full-time vice president level position. Both the airport
services company and the airport management company
have designed their safety management systems around
ICAO’s SMM. The ground services manager described the
company’s adherence to ICAO standards as ". . . very
strong. We use SMM completely [sic]."
Safety Risk Management
The heart of safety risk management is identifying
hazards, considering risk as a part of decision making,
determining levels of risk for various threats, and
mitigating risks.
For hazard identification, the research airport has a
digital hazard reporting system available to anyone through
its website. The report is very detailed and includes
information about who was involved, where the issue/
incident took place, and the prevailing weather conditions,
among other things. Individuals may choose to leave
certain fields blank (either for inapplicability or to remain
anonymous) and the reports will still be accepted by the
system.
The ground service provider and air traffic controllers
also have hazard reporting systems. For air traffic
controllers, when an issue arises they can summon a
supervisor who will log the event in a daily log that is
maintained for each shift. This is necessary because while a
controller is on the job he/she is unable to take time away
from duties to make a report. The daily log includes items
such as foreign objects being found on taxiways, birds in
the area, or runway or taxiway closures (which can be
initiated by the controllers themselves or by order from the
airport company). At the end of each shift, the supervisor
will approve the daily log and forward it to the ATC chief.
ATC uses a different reporting form for serious incidents. If
there is an aircraft accident or incident involving damage to
humans or equipment, a special report will be filed to CAA
to proceed with an investigation.
The ground services operator has a robust reporting
system that allows employees to submit reports directly to
the safety office of the company. This in-house SMS
reporting system is different from the airport management’s

reporting system. In cases where a reporter wishes to file a
report concerning a risk or hazard, he/she will file a report
either with their own company or to the airport reporting
system, depending on which organization has the capacity
to apply corrective action.
The next step in safety risk management process is
reviewing reports and making decisions. The airport
accomplishes this through the use of committees. There
are two types of committees administered by the airport
company’s SMS. First, there is an overall SMS committee
which meets on a biannual basis. Members of the
committee include representatives from every airline, the
airport company, all ground services providers, cargo
operators, maintenance facilities, and air traffic control.
This committee has more than 50 members and this is the
opportunity where the multiple safety programs in and
around the research airport can merge for discussion and
review. This committee also publishes periodic reports and
safety data, and all of their reports and statistics tracking are
published on their website. In addition, it makes use of
specific safety risk analysis tools, such as a risk assessment
matrix whose threshold levels for severity are determined
by the safety committee.
The overall SMS committee also has several subcommittees (the second type committee). These are known
as professional groups, and there are currently six at the
research airport. The purpose of these subcommittees is to
meet more regularly, once every three months, receive
reports from the hazard reporting system related to their
area of operation, and can further safety discussion in their
specific area of operation.
Safety Assurance
Safety assurance is provided in a variety of ways at the
research airport. For the ground services provider, the
strongest area of safety assurance is the "closed-loop"
nature of the hazard reporting system and safety committee.
Any time inputs are received and corrective actions are
applied, the result of such actions is evaluated by the safety
committee to determine if the action was appropriate and
successfully mitigated the issue. If not, a new correction
can be applied. This kind of cycle of review prevents
actions from being applied and ignored with no follow up.
The air traffic controllers have a much more responsive
system of safety assurance in that they will know very
quickly if an applied action is not working or has not
mitigated the hazard.
It is important to note that because the nature of the
hazards seen by ATC are very different from those seen by
the airport company or ground services provider, their
corrective actions must conform to a very high level of
accuracy and their detection for whether an action is
unsuccessful must be extremely fast. Therefore, safety
assurance for ATC is very time sensitive and usually comes
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from only the active controllers themselves, or, in some
cases, the supervisor on duty. As one air traffic controller
said, "We have to make decisions right away. Not a lot of
time for thinking about it."
The airport company has a slightly different method of
safety assurance from the other two organizations in this
study. For one, they make use of professional groups to
review actions taken by the full airport-wide SMS
committee to ensure that the individuals most impacted
by a given decision or action support it as well as help to
implement it. According to one safety manager, "Because
the airport SMS is so big, professional groups help look at
issues faster." Professional groups include air traffic
services, fueling, maintenance, cargo, flight operations,
and security.
The airport company also utilizes another means of
safety assurance: transparency with the general public. The
company, through its website, provides the results of safety
audits and reviews at the airport. It also maintains a list of
received hazards reports (de-identified) and publishes
safety data so people can see the improvements it has
made or needs to make. As an airport safety manager
described, "You can actually find all the safety data on our
web site. We show everything."
Safety Promotion
Safety is promoted in a wide variety of ways at the
research airport. Once again, each type of organization
represented in this study had various methods of promoting
safety to its stakeholders, participants, and employees. As
building a positive safety culture is critical, organizations
have put heavy effort into making sure everyone is not only
aware of the SMS programs in place, but to help instill the
values of SMS in the whole organization so that everyone
is individually empowered to be a contributor to the overall
safety of the research airport.
The ground services provider imposes several promotional advertisements to employees, via e-mails and flyers
on company bulletin boards, to encourage its employees to
participate in its hazard reporting system. It also releases
periodic safety newsletters so that employees can be up-todate on various safety issues. One safety manager from the
ground services company said, "Nobody at our company
doubts our commitment to safety. We are very clear about
that and they all know it." Air traffic controllers have a
similar method of promotion, but in addition to textual
promotions, utilize their daily briefing to help share safety
issues.
The airport company itself takes a very aggressive
approach to safety promotion. The airport company’s
stakeholders include local people living in suburbs around
the research airport, so their safety promotion strategy
includes them as well. For example, the airport company
sponsors an annual "Safety Week". During this time, safety

69

managers visit local schools and do presentations for
students regarding aviation safety and news about the
airport. In addition, they sponsor various promotions
throughout the week, including e-mails, flyers, and
displays.
The airport company also provides briefings for new
contractors, such as airlines, cargo companies, and terminal
vendors. This briefing provides information about the SMS
at the airport and how they can participate if they observe
any safety related issues. It provides details about the
reporting system, professional groups, and invites the new
organization to participate.
Conclusions
This study sought to answer several research questions,
and through observation of three large organizations at the
research airport, some conclusions can be made regarding
the airport’s compliance with ICAO standards of safety
management.
The first research question was: "To what extent does the
research airport implement ICAO standards?" Based on
the areas of safety policy and organization, safety risk
management, and safety promotion, the airport appears to
exhibit a high level of ICAO SMM compliance based on
the observed elements. All organizations claim they base
their SMS on that document specifically, and all appear to
engage in SMS implementation in the same manner as if
Taiwan was a member of ICAO itself.
The second research question was: "What safety policies
does the research airport’s management have in place?"
The research airport’s management company utilizes a
hazard reporting system for its safety program, as well as an
SMS committee and respective sub-committees (professional groups). In addition, it employs various methods of
safety assurance and safety promotion in the forms of
transparency, publishing of safety data, and an aggressive
safety promotion campaign.
Next, the study posed: "How do stakeholders in aviation
safety at the research airport participate with safety
management?" As it turns out, there are a wide variety of
stakeholders in the research airport’s safety management.
These include air traffic controllers, commercial carriers,
ground service organizations, passengers, terminal vendors,
and local people. The research airport has an aggressive
and creative safety campaign to involve as many of them as
possible. As part of the importance of SMS lies in how it
mobilizes participants, airport organizations are going to
great lengths to involve everyone in safety, through
proactive briefings about safety, to community outreach.
This study found strong evidence indicating stakeholder
involvement with the SMS at the research airport, which is
very important to successful safety management.
The fourth research question was: "How are risks
identified and managed at the research airport?" While
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the three organizations in this study had various methods of
measuring and evaluating risks, the airport company itself
administered the overall safety committee, and did so in a
way that is compliant with current ICAO standards. The
safety committee meets regularly and includes members
from all organizations at the airport. As a matter of
practicality and efficiency for receiving and reviewing
safety reports, those organizations have been divided into
professional sub-groups to handle issues related to their
aspect of operations. The airport hazard reporting system
itself is also consistent with ICAO SMM standards. It has
multiple formats, can be anonymous as the reporter
chooses, and its reports are addressed at safety meetings
of the full SMS committee. While there are several subSMS programs in various organizations, data from those
programs is able to rise to the SMS committee level so it
can be addressed by the airport has a whole if necessary.
Lastly, the final research question was: "How is safety
promoted at the research airport?" Through investigation
into these three major organizations, it is clear that the
research airport aggressively pursues safety promotion, to a
level that even exceeds ICAO SMS requirements. The
amount of genuine safety promotion, through "Safety
Week," new organization briefings, and publications
indicates an enormous emphasis on safety discussion and
support. Proper safety promotion is critical to ensuring the
success of the system, and the research airport makes a
large effort to inform everyone about safety values, best
practices, hazard reporting, and proactive safety strategies.
ICAO Safety Management Compliance
Overall, the evidence collected in this study has
indicated that safety management at the research airport
is mostly consistent with aviation safety management
standards set by ICAO through its Safety Management
Manual. Using the SMM as a standard, organizations at the
research airport have created several, but not necessarily
redundant, Safety Management Systems which all support
the airport management company’s SMS.
It is important to note that there are a few deviations
from ICAO SMM policies and procedures. For one, the
SMM prescribes a full-time safety manager, and while
several sub-organizations at the research airport have
dedicated safety managers, the airport company only
utilizes a part-time safety manager from within the flight
operations department. In addition, the full safety committee could be more responsive if it met more frequently,
even though the professional groups do meet more often to
provide more specified safety guidance. While there isn’t a
specific frequency specified by the ICAO SMM, the
number of meetings should be a function of the complexity
of the airport operations and necessity of addressing safety
issues.

As Taiwan is not a member of ICAO, its largest airport’s
level of compliance with the SMM is impressive. Overall,
the airport addresses key components of safety hazard
reporting, safety risk management, safety assurance, and
safety promotion in ways that are consistent with the ICAO
SMM. This helps ensure a near-seamless travel experience
to and from Taipei from a safety standpoint, and as safety
management at the research airport continues to improve, it
will certainly be a good example of a healthy SMS in the
airport environment.
While all of the evidence collected was in line with these
conclusions, more extensive interviews with front-line
employees would have uncovered a greater depth of
information that might have shown other areas for
improvement. Because of the limited nature of the study,
the conclusions presented are surface-level only. Future
studies within the research airport should focus on
interviewing front-line employees under the condition of
anonymity, and collecting non-interview data to verify the
findings.
Further Study
As SMS continues to be implemented worldwide, further
study is critical for both determining the challenges
associated with establishing SMS in multicultural settings
as well as how non-ICAO members manage safety in
aviation. SMS is a relatively young managerial concept,
and as it develops, it is important to understand how it
unfolds across various cultures, countries, legal environments, and financial environments. Understanding the ways
in which SMS is effective and successful, as well as those
in which it could improve or be enhanced will ultimately
help ensure the aviation industry is as safe as possible.
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